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This paper addresses some of the socio/psychological problems
expected to accompany such a long-duration mission as a trip to Mars.
The emphasis is on those issues which are expected to have a bearing on
crew performance.
Results from research into aircraft accidents, particularly those
related to pilot performance, are discussed briefly, as a limited analog
to space flight. Significant comparisons are also made to some aspects
of long-duration antarctic stays, submarine missions, and oceanographic
vessel voyages. Appropriate lessons learned from U.S. and Russian space
flight experiences are provided throughout the paper.
Design of space missions and systems to enhance crew performance is
discussed at length, considering factors external and internal to the
crew. The importance of incorporating such design factors early in the
design process is stressed.
INTRODUCTION
A manned mission to Mars is expected to last some 600 days. Forty
days would be spent on the planet and the round trip would take some 280
days each way. Such a mission would requlre a high level of investment
and consequently would carry expectations of a good return. The crew
would be the focus--the hand of man--in this first direct human touch on
this distant planet.
The socio/psychological problems that need to be addressed for such
a long mission to such a distant planet are the issues related to crew
performance. The acceptable range of performance will vary from a non-
negotiable criteria for survival to high productivity, both while at Mars
and on the trip to and from the planet. The approach is to explore the
areas susceptible to planning and design that will sustain the crews and
optimize their performance.
PERFORMANCE
Crew performance, in its simplest definition, means that the crews
will be able to carry out the mission objectives successfully and will
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complete the entire trip safely. Enhanced performance implies that the
crew will not only do all that is expected well, but they will also be
able to do things that were not planned for and which clearly enhance the
mission outcome. The foundations for such crew performance are those
which foster crew members who are alert, attentive, vigilant, motivated,
flexible, skilled, knowledgeable, aware of and understand the mission
goals and spacecraft systems, able to successfully operate and maintain
the equipment during the entire mission, and are capable of functioning
effectively as a small team.
Of course It would be unreasonable to expect a mission of this
length and type to be without any problems. With this as a basic posi-
tion, the high level of performance is set as an ideal goal, and planning
and design should focus upon the optimization of that goal given the
knowledge, funding, and resources available.
The job to be done In the planning phase relative to crew perfor-
mance, then, is to determine the levels of performance that can be
reasonably expected on the flight, to identify the design features and
operational approaches that can be developed to achieve those standards,
and to establish methods within the program structure for the design and
development of the hardware, training, and operations that will
effectively include these features.
_tM_,OGS
PILOT ERROR
Space flights have been enormously successful, and thus it is easy
to assume that the procedures used in the past are more than sufficient
to the task of preparing for a Mars mission. A Mars mission is different
from our past experiences in a number of fundamental ways which makes
thls an untenable assumption. First, the trip to Mars is far longer than
any mission ever undertaken In space. It includes a descent to the
planet, operations on the planet, and return to the mother ship that will
demand the maintenance of complex landing, ascent, and docking skills.
It will require dependence on high levels of automation. It will require
a high degree of interpersonal and group living skills.
Though flying a modern commercial jet airplane is not an exact
replica of such a mission, there is much that can be learned from the
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intense work that has been done in looking at the human factors that are
related to accidents.
The first thing we find is that the human factors are a major
ingredient in accidents. We also find that though automation solves some
of these problems, it can cause other problems. It is also extremely
clear that ti_e human factor is extremely complex, and is not accessible
from simple common sense examinations. First we need to ask the right
questions, then devise ways to seek answers, and finally we will be ready
to ask how we can optimize performance.
In the early research into aircraft accidents, the question that was
asked was "what went wrong, or what happened?" The next set of questions
begin to explore "why?" These need to be followed by "what goes wrong?"
and "why?" Some of the areas that have been found to be related to
accidents have been identified in a recent book on pilot error, and
include: (I) Human perception, information processing, attention,
decision making, and action; (2) Visual illusions as related to refrac-
tion, textures, and autokinetics; (3) Assumptions when related to
expectancy, anxiety, focus of attention, and as related to periods of
high concentration; (4) Habits; (5) Motivation with its level and
direction; (6) Stress and stressful environments; (7) Fatigue; (8)
Workload; (9) Judgement; (10) Failures of automatic equipment; (11)
Failures of automatic equipment compounded by crew error; (12) Failure
to monitor; (]3) Loss of proflciency; (14) Lack of proper vigilance;
(15) Crew coordination; (16) Confusing documentation; (17) Workplace
design; (18) l)Jsp]ays; (19) Software; (20) Cockpit discipline and
professionalism; (2_) Command as leadership or intimidation; and (22)
Communication. {see Hurst, PILOT ERROR, NY: Aronson, 1982)
This research into aircraft accidents, and consequently pilot per-
formance, shows a very complicated set of variables that occur in very
dynamic contexts. It also demonstrates dramatically that the performance
of the person inside of and running a complex machine needs to be
examined with as much intensity, rigor, dispassion, detachment, and
objectivity as any other system in that machine. Because a person ca__nn
adapt, does not _ean they al_ays will, or that their capacity to do so Is
unlimited. What has been found in this field is that when a professional
approach is taken to the understanding of the person as a legitimate
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subsystem interfacing with many other subsystems, much can be done to
optimize the performance of both the machine and the person--total system
optimization can be enhanced. Any serious attempt to develop the
elements required for a Mars mission will need to include a thorough
immersion and understanding of the work that has been done in this field.
PRECEDENTS
The most obvious precedents to a Mars mission are the very long
Soviet missions on their Salyut Space Stations. The record to date is
237 days. Crews showed that they could perform successfully for that
amount of time, though many problems were identified. As these missions
have become longer and longer, the Russians have gradually enhanced the
design of the station, the communications, the types of supplies, and the
daily operational schedules. They still have much to do, but they have
clearly shown progress. Any serious planning for a mission to Mars would
need to evaluate carefully the lessons learned on these flights. It
should be noted that the Russians have found that the provisions they
have made for the socJo/psychologJca] factors have been extremely impor-
tant in maintaining crew performance.
Other analogs, such as long stays at the Antarctic, nuclear sub-
marine patrols that last for 90 days or more, oceanographic research
vessel voyages, etc., also provide much valuable insight into the factors
related to the performance of people in Isolated and confined environ-
ments for long periods of time. One important outcome of the examination
of these analogs, however, is the point that isolation and confinement,
per se, do not usually cause dysfunctional performance on the part of
crews. Rather, isolation and confinement exacerbates conditions that are
stressful or error generating, acting as a catalyst which makes difficult
conditions much worse than they would be in any other environment. This
leads us to the need to consider the factors related to the generation of
stress, error, and otherwise dysfunctional performance with the assump-
tion that once identified, many of the factors can be attenuated through
design, training, and planning. The range of experience and research to
draw upon thus extends beyond that found in isolated and confined
environments to the whole realm of performance, productivity, error, and
stress.
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THE CONTEXTUAL APPROACB
There are two levels of context to be taken into account in
designing to enhance performance. The first is the context of the
mission itself, meaning the spacecraft, the crew, the operations, etc.
The second is the context of the design process that generates the space-
craft, tlle mission objectives, the operations, etc.
Any study of the work to be done relative to performance, produc-
tivity, error, and stress, requires a systematic approach which will
ensure the results will be pertinent to a Mars mission. The space
environment is significantly different because of microgravity, radia-
tion, total provision for life support, and lack of accessibility for
rescue, and thus the total context of the mission must constantly be kept
in mind. Human performance is the result of a vast range of constantly
changing events and influences which occur in a series and over time
within this context.
Figure 1 shows some of the elements that need to be taken into
account in evaluating the performance of crew in a space flight.
THE FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CONTEXT
People act in a context of perceived and unperceived factors which,
in concert at any given time, influence the nature, content, and quality
of their thoughts and actions. Furthermore, this context is constantly
changing. There is a present, past, and future milieu, all of which
impinge on the moment. None of these circumstances is static (the rose
and the banana never remain the same, day after day).
The changing context can be looked at from two points of view:
Internal and External. Actions are carried out by an individual within a
space and time that includes many features of the physical environment as
well as the presence and actions of other people--the External Context.
At the same time, these people act relative to the scope of their own
capacities, perceptions, physical state, and experiences--the Internal
Context. Performance enhancement includes both of these contexts.
The broken lines with two arrowheads signify the idea that the
external context impinges upon the individual, but that it is filtered by
the internal context,
coupled with motivation,
mance or behavior.
resulting in a mental and physical tone which,
processing and perception, results in a perfor-
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The External Context
There are eight factors that make up the External Context: (1)
Weightlessness; (2) Environment; (3) Technology; (4) Goals; (5) Other
People; (6) Hazards; (7) Organization; and (8) Geography, or more
properly, Location.
The External Context has been found to be an important factor in
crew performance. Poorly designed environments can cause undue frustra-
tion, stimulate error, create fatigue, and impact overall motivation and
morale, consequently affecting the performance of the crews. The effects
of these factors are related to errors, accidents, increases in the time
needed to perform tasks, decreases in the amount of effective work time,
poor planning, increases in the time Jt takes to detect errors or
problems, and higher numbers of experiments or tasks that need to be re-
peated or redone because of original mistakes. Once the cycle of diffi-
culty starts, it can snowball as the crews try to make up for the losses
and attempt to maintain the original objectives. Stress in the External
Context quickly increases stress in the Internal Context. In the con-
fined and isolated environment of a spacecraft on the trip to or from
Mars, there are also few diversions to permit a turnaround--re-creation--
making it all the more important to minimize as many potential stress or
error generators as possible.
The design and control of the External Context is therefore signifi-
cantly related to the overall performance and success of the crews,
especially on a mission as long as the one to Mars. The initial danger,
however, is to focus on the engineering and technical tasks in the design
and development phases, assuming that the human elements can be inserted
at some later time, or to assume that the crew will be so well chosen
that they could be expected to adapt to design difficulties. A certain
degree of failure would be expected, so that success beyond the primary
mission of going, landing, and returning safely, would be a bonus given
such a dangerous and unknown mission. This does not have to be the case.
So much is known about the design of External Contexts that facilitate
human performance that the inclusion into the early phases of the engi-
neering design would not be extremely difficult or expensive. The out-
come would not only go a long way in providing for the success of the
mission, but also would enhance the cost effectiveness of the return
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relative to the investment. The real challenge here is the organizatonal
one of providing an effective method for embedding the human performance
factors into the design and development process itself.
Weightlessness
Crew performance is dramatically affected by the microgravity
environment due to its effect on all types of material objects and
mediums, the posture of the human body, the need for various kinds of
restraints to obtain leverage or stability to perform a wide range of
actions and to manage equipment or materials, and the freedom of movement
and placement it provides that is not present in the one-gravity of
Earth.
Skylab crews found that attempting to maintain an erect posture
for long periods of time was painful on stomach muscles. Equipment needs
to be designed to the neutral posture the body assumes in space. Shuttle
experience shows that a significant amount of time can be spent in caring
for personal hygiene and daily maintenance. Control of small articles of
material or equipment could be a major problem if there were not adequate
restraints. The Soviets discovered that they could solder in space, but
that the residue could easily float into their eyes. SmalI pieces of
paper, tools, water, food, or parts could get lost or float behind panels
either to be gone, or possibly to damage the equipment. Because of the
freedom of movement that weightlessness presents, lighting is also
affected. Simple ceiling lighting would not be helpful if someone
chooses to work in an anomalous position. Traffic patterns, layout, and
handholds will be different because people float to translate from one
place to another, and need some means of stopping their forward motion
without danger to themselves or to the equipment.
Weightlessness provides significant opportunities for the
modularization of interior components so that they can be detached and
moved or replaced as the need arises regardless of the weight.
In weightlessness, odors and heat can collect in various nooks
and crannies of the structures which can result in unpleasantness or
contamination that could affect health.
Tools and equipment need to be designed for weightlessness.
The Soviets have made special screwdrivers, hammers, wrenches, and
cutters to be used in the weightless environment. Medical equipment, for
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instance, will provide special challenges because so much of current
medical practice and equipment is implicitly dependent on one-gravity
(for Instance, a special IV system will need to be designed).
Design thus will need to be fitted to weightlessness if the
crew is to avoid the frustrations, accidents, and errors that could be
generated by designs that are not carefully thought through.
Environment
The Russians have made many changes to enhance the physical
elements of the space station interior environment. In order to lower
the noise from fans and other equipment, they have developed tools and
systems that permit the crews to replace and move the equipment during
the flights. Space Shuttle measurements of noise show an 80 DB level in
the Forward Avionics Bay at the floor level (25 DB over the recommended
55 DB design standard), 68 DB in the center of the Mid Deck, 61-64 in the
sleep areas, and spikes up to 87 DB when the Waste Collection System is
used. Skylab also showed that in spite of the low 5 psia atmosphere,
sleep could be interrupted by intermittent noise or the movement of
another crew member around the cabin. Soviet cosmonauts and sailors have
also commented on the comfort of a constant noise at a reasonable level,
but that intermittent noise, extremely loud noise, or the starting or
stopping of noise in unexpected ways could be quite stressful.
• The Soviets have also made changes in the visual appearance of
the interiors of the Salyut Space Stations with the addition of stronger
colors on the walls and ceilings, contrasting accent colors, and provi-
sion for the display of posters, pictures, and other personal items
brought by the crews. Soviet uniforms also are characterized by a
variety of colors and designs to provide visual stimulation and variety.
Color television has been installed to permit the crews to interact with
family, friends, scientists, and engineers on the ground as well as
permit the use of videocassettes which can provide a wide range of visual
stimulation. All of these have been provided to alleviate boredom and
the monotonous nature of life in such confined and unchanging sur-
roundings.
Another environmental contextual factor that has been found
important is food. Tastes seem to change over the total scope of a
mission, and meals are important times of the day both to enjoy the food,
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but also to fill social needs. At one point, the Soviets ceased planning
the meals for the flight crews and simply asked them to meet a given
caloric intake each day in order to permit them to make the choices
themselves. (However, nutritional requirements have been given priority
again and some system of meal planning is to be reinstated). Crews are
supplied with fresh fruits and vegetables by the Progress resupply ship
which comes every three to six weeks, and a special hatch was installed
to permit thls loading to Cake place, but a few hours before the Progress
launch. The Soviets have also worked at learning to grow lettuce and
other vegetables onboard the ship (watching the growth of plants and
flowers also seems to supply an important psychological boost).
Technology
The balance of automation and machines that require human
manipulation will be an extremely important variable In a trip to Mars.
There must be enough automation to permit the crew to be fairly small and
to leave the crew sufficient time to carry out the experiments and daily
operations of the long flight. At the same time, there can not be too
much automatlon--leavlng the crews with little to do--the seeds of bore-
dom. Furthermore, the automated systems must have a level of reliabil-
ICy, as perceived by the crews, that inspires confidence for such a long
trip. If a system breaks down, can the crews fix it? If it fails, can
they carry out the operations manually and will their skill level be
maintainable for a wide range of operationally related failures that can
not be easily predicted? Will they know if the equipment has failed or
perhaps shifted data or operations in some minimally detectable way?
What is the back up? How transparent is it? How much skill Is required
to explore the system for malfunctions or to reset it to respond to unex-
pected events? To what degree can false alarms which will persuade the
crew to take action that is not required affect safety or equipment, or
to what degree can they become so frequent as to be generally ignored?
To what degree can the crews induce error in setting up automated equip-
ment and how significant can that be? Can the crew fail to monitor the
equipment adequately either from boredom or from excessive confidence?
How much knowledge or skill would be required to perform a major repair
on any of the automated systems? How will the automation affect the
basic attitudes the crew members have toward their roles and their
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importance in carrying out tasks? Can we design automated systems the
way users want them designed when the user may not be identified for some
ten years or so?
Automated systems are necessary for space flight, but they do
misbehave. Tile Soviets installed a flight navigation computer called the
Del'ta which at one point began to store data that was to be used, but
it erased data that was still needed. The crew had to replace the
memory, and the memory replacement took a week with the use of the
telemetry from the ground. The Soviets are moving to higher and higher
levels of automation, however. They have installed much more sophisti-
cated systems on their Kosmos 1443 type logistics module to provide for
precise navigation and pointing, and they use automatic systems for
transferring fuel, gases, and liquids from the Progress resupply vehicle
to the Salyut 7. They have found that large ground support teams are
extremely expensive to maintain and to keep alert and say they hope to
transfer a large number of these current ground operations to the space
station itself by means of automation.
The Soviets have gone to considerable lengths to provide for
onboard maintenance and repair of both small and large systems. They
have carried out a major fuel line bypass, installed new solar arrays,
disengaged a very large tangled and stuck antenna, and moved and replaced
thermal pumps which were permanently installed with welded metal clamps.
They are working on a cutting, welding, soldering, and spraying tool.
They have used drills and power saws. The assumption here is that things
can and will malfunction or break down and they need to be fixed by the
flight crews. To do this, it is necessary to supply adequate tools and
information to carry out the tasks whether they are anticipated or
unanticipated, IVA or EVA.
Goals
Tim goals of the mission, and the way they are understood and
perceived by the crews will be important drivers in guiding their actions
and supporting their motivation. The first Mars mission wi]] be suffi-
ciently unique and outstanding in that it will carry a hlgh leverage for
the crews and thus this factor wlll not be as critical as goals will be
later when missions in space and to places llke Mars become routine.
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Other PeoE_
The special chemistry of a given group of people at a given
time, and as it changes over time, will be an extremely important factor
in the capacity of the crews to perform well and to maintain their
motivation, morale, attention, vigilance, and alertness over the entire
length of time it will take to go and return from Mars. Since there is
total isolation and total confinement, the crews will be forced to meet
and manage all of the problems created in the dynamics of their small
community. With events, they will probably change, and so it is not
possible to predict all of the factors that will be present over time.
Much is known about the dynamics of small groups, and that can
be of great value in preparing the station and the crews for the social
and interpersonal relationships they will encounter.
As an External Context, other people are salient in terms of
their values, the degree to which they meet and abide by perceived stan-
dards and rules, their capacity to support the team, and their general
compatibility in terms of customs, culture, and the resulting manifest
behavior. Submarine crews speak of the "testing" that is done to new
members of a crew to see if they can be "depended on" in an emergency and
the Soviets have spoken and written frequently on the need for compati-
bility if crews are to be successful. In spite of their rather extensive
efforts to provide for compatibility, they still report on instances of
interpersonal stress and conflict that can intrude on the mission goals.
To meet the need for manageable and smooth interpersonal
relationships, methods for selection and training can be merged with the
development of organizational systems that will enhance the day-to-day
management of the small group dynamics of the crew.
Hazards
For socio/psychological reasons, the perception of hazards and
methods used to combat those hazards may be more important than the
actual reality. On a mission of this length, there are a wide range of
potential hazards which include radiation, hits by space debris or
meteorites, medical emergencies, or mechanical failures, to mention a
few. The crew needs to be confident that they have a good chance of
identifying and compensating for these kinds of hazards. In the Nuclear
Submarine Service, for instance, crews do not see the escape or rescue
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measures as the most significant control for an accident at sea. Rather,
they perceive their ongoing maintenance and repair capability combined
with the skills and knowledge of their crewmates as the primary means of
preventing such eventualities before they ever happen. On modern SSBN or
Attack submarines, none of the life support or ship's control systems are
fully automated. Rather, crew members carry out most of these monitoring
and control activities and, where computers are used, they perform a
backup function.
O£ganization
The organization of a small group needs to fit the job to be
done, the specific conditions of the job, and the people who are the mem-
bers of the group. An organization that works well in one situation may
not be transferable to another situation, or to another group of people.
Both astronauts and cosmonauts who have flown on very long
missions say there is a qualitative difference between short missions of
a month or less and long missions of three or more months. It is much
easier to make adjustments for a short mission than on the long ones.
Decision Making
The Soviets have told their crews not to stress the
command structure in daily activities, and have been willing to let the
crews themselves determine who will carry out various activities during
the mission. The kinds of decisions that need to be made for scientific
research require a high level of flexibility and group consensus where
priorities are involved. The decision making in an emergency, however,
leaves little room for discussion, requiring a clear line of authority
and unambiguous instructions. In the Antarctic with the current system
of using civilian support teams, one team leader made a clear distinction
between the routine decisions to be made relative to support and science,
anti those to be made in an emergency. The scientists were to carry out
their own activities with no interference from him or his support team,
but they were to keep him informed of what they were doing. He would
become involved only if there were some problem of safety, use of re-
sources, or of conflict with other station activities. However, if an
emergency occurred, he was to be in unquestioned control.
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experiments
experiments
specialize
itself.
in terms of their own degrees of interest during the
Schedules
As their experience with long missions increased, the
Soviets created a schedule that permits many breaks during tile day and
two days off each week (see Figure 2). Crew members will work themselves
very hard when a mission begins, and will soon become fatigued and
stressed if they keep up a high pace of activity. The Soviets have
required that the crew take time out for leisure activites and they have
a Group for Psychological Support on the ground who provide activities
and supply special foods, videotapes, cassettes, books, surprises, two-
way TV interviews and conversations with friends or famous people on the
ground, TV or radio broadcasts of sports events, music, news, etc. In
the beginning, the crews complain about this "waste of time" but, _ts the
mission becomes longer, they speak of looking forward to these simple
pleasures. The experiment system is also varied. Crews will focus on
one or two types of experiments for a few months, and then will shift to
another regime. On a given day, they will also focus on one or two
or activities. Crew members are trained to do all of the
(they may train for four years for a mission) but tend to
mission
American Skylab astronauts also have spoken frequently
about the need for a degree of onboard control of schedules and activi-
ties by the crews themselves. The lack of control was especially stress-
ful when the ground specified in extreme detail every action down to the
minute with little room for error or change.
Relationships
The Soviets have experimented with mixed crews for short
periods of time by inviting cosmonauts from different countries to fly
for a week or so and to devise and carry out a wide range of experiments.
They have also flown a woman twice on these short missions. V. Remek,
the Czechoslovakian cosmonaut, commented on the need to do a very wide
range of planning and training relative to language and cultural differ-
ences if such mixed crews were to fly together for very long periods of
time due to the potential for misunderstandings and the consequences
which could result.
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Experiences at the Antarctic strongly reinforce the need
to prepare with diligence for small crews wlth mixed cultural backgrounds
even within nationalities but from different subgroups (scientists and
Navy support teams) where misunderstandings and conflicting values and
views can easily come to impede the mission goals. During one mission,
the team leader attempted to minimize the gap between his civilian
support team and the scientists by having Saturday evening reports on the
scientific experiments that were being done (which ended up as parties),
and by encouraging the support team members to help the scientists out in
collecting their data and maintaining the equipment. To reciprocate, the
scientists helped In some of the station maintenance tasks. Crews who
participated in this sharing gave It very high marks and this mission
apparently experienced less of the interpersonal problems encountered on
other misslons.
Rewards
Crews need some means to measure and recognize accom-
plishments that they find significant. Soviet crew members can look
forward to national recognition, medals, trlps, and career advancement
for the long run, as well as confirmation of scientific breakthroughs by
talking to renowned scientists during the flight. A 600-day mission will
need some sustaining method to reinforce the efforts of the crews during
the long stretches of the trip.
The Location
A Mars crew will be beyond rescue for almost the entirety of
their voyage. This will be of enormous significance in the socio/psycho-
logical aspects of the mlssion.
The Internal Context
Each crew member will bring to the misslon a whole set of internal
predispositions, and these will be constantly influenced by the External
Context and the events of the mission as it progresses. It is this
Internal Context which is the seat of the capacity of the crew member to
perform we]]. The choice that will need to be made prior to the mission
will be whether to stress selection or training in putting togetheL' the
crew for the mission. Selection is an easy choice, but people change
over time; thus selection is a useful but a limited option. It is neces-
sary, but not sufficient. Training can facilitate skills and knowledge,
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but more than is currently believed, also general internal predisposi-
tions, thus making the pool of available people larger when focusing upon
genera] skill and knowledge. People can successfully be taught how to
change attitudes, habits, and perceptual orientations as well as how to
understand and interact successfully in small groups.
THE PROGRAM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT
Oddly enough, this Program Context is probably the most difficult
one to change, and yet absolutely essential to the actualization of
performance enhancement measures. To date, space programs have been
driven within limited budgets and primarily to engineering criteria.
Vehicles were experimental or developmental, missions were all fairly
short, and crews were expected to adjust to the compromises that had to
be made throughout the whole design and development process. As long as
missions were short, this was a reasonable expectation and crews have
shown both ingenuity and creativity in their ability to make these
systems work.
With the maturity of the space program, however, there is a danger
that these systems which were seen as very successful will be brought
into a Mars mission design complete with the engineering focus. (If it
isn't broke, don't fix it.) In this perspective, many of the elements
that are required to provide for crew productivity and
socio/psychologlcal stability are seen as either luxuries or superfluous
and are the first things to be cut as the program proceeds. Old program
systems do not automatically include these design issues, and change is
generally resisted because of the alterations it requires in the design
processes. It is very difficult to include the performance factors as
equal to the power or life support factors in change boards and in
budgeting criteria. With the engineering culture of the aerospace commu-
nity in government and in industry, such an inclusion will represent a
qualitative change in the way they do business, and hence will require
major alterations in attitudes, values, and procedures--a change in the
culture.
What is paradoxical about this issue is that early inputs relative
to performance factors and crew support are not always that expensive.
They become prohibitive when they are introduced later, once the design
has been set, and thus involve significant and costly redesign. An early
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legitimacy for the performance and crew support factors in the design and
budget system would thus provide for the inclusion of the contextual
factors that are most conducive to the enhancement of the living and
working conditions of the crew over the long 600 days of the flight. The
success of the mission may depend on it.
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